

## **Political parties of the radical direction in Ukraine: is this strengthening of the national security or threats? (On the example of AUU “Svoboda”)**

The relevance of political parties of radical direction in Ukraine has been considered. The main stages of party evolution and indicators of radicalism at each stage have been traced on the example of AUU “Svoboda”. The level of support for the radical agenda by the citizens of Ukraine has been revealed on the basis of the results of voting in the parliamentary elections. Reasons for the high level of support during the 2012 parliamentary elections and factors for the gradual decline in support have been analyzed. The main forms of radical actions and statements and their impact on the population of the country, the agenda of the political process and national security have been assessed. An assessment of a provocative character of a number of public actions and statements that are aimed at different addresses has been made.

*Keywords: political party, radicalism, ethnic nationalism, ideological identification, national security*

## **Partie polityczne radykalnego kierunku na Ukrainie: czy to wzmocnienie bezpieczeństwa narodowego, czy zagrożenia? (Na przykładzie AUU „Svoboda”)**

Rozważono znaczenie partii politycznych o radykalnym kierunku na Ukrainie. Główne etapy ewolucji partii i wskaźniki radykalizmu na każdym etapie zostały prześledzone na przykładzie AUU „Svoboda”. Poziom poparcia obywateli Ukrainy dla radykalnej agendy ujawnił się na podstawie wyników głosowania w wyborach parlamentarnych. Przeanalizowano przyczyny wysokiego poparcia w wyborach parlamentarnych w 2012 r. oraz czynniki powolnego spadku poparcia. Oceniono główne formy radykalnych działań i wypowiedzi oraz ich wpływ na ludność kraju, agendę procesu politycznego i bezpieczeństwo narodowe. Dokonano oceny prowokacyjnego charakteru szeregu działań publicznych i wypowiedzi skierowanych do różnych adresatów.

*Słowa kluczowe: partia polityczna, radykalizm, nacjonalizm etniczny, identyfikacja ideologiczna, bezpieczeństwo narodowe*

## **Політичні партії радикального спрямування в Україні: посилення національної безпеки чи загрози?(на прикладі ВО «Свобода»)**

Розглянуто актуальність вивчення політичних партій радикального спрямування в Україні. На прикладі ВО «Свобода» простежено основні етапи партійної еволюції та показники радикалізму на кожному етапі. Рівень підтримки радикального порядку денного громадянами України виявлено на підставі результатів голосування на парламентських виборах. Проаналізовано причини високого рівня підтримки під час парламентських виборів 2012 р. та чинники поступового зниження рівня підтримки. Оцінено основні форми радикальних дій і заяв та їх вплив на населення країни, порядок денний політичного процесу та національну безпеку. Зроблена оцінка про провокативний характер низки публічних дій і заяв, які спрямовані на різні адресати.

*Ключові слова:* політична партія, радикалізм, етнічний націоналізм, ідеологічна ідентифікація, національна безпека

The issue of radical parties in Ukraine is quite sensitive, as it is accompanied by numerous PR events involving politicians and political forces from different countries. Perhaps the most famous are the statements of the president of Russia about the “business card of Yarosh” (the head of the “Right Sector”). Summarizing the previous experience, we can state that the assessment of existing and current radical groups as threatening the liberal-democratic course of Ukraine, dangerous for national minorities living in Ukraine and treating them as “hawks” outside Ukraine is actively spreading, seeking to steer Ukraine towards a tough course of ethnic nationalism within the country and an aggressive course towards its neighbors. However, if we pay attention to the reaction of political actors and citizens within Ukraine itself, we can talk about much less attention to the activities of Ukrainian radicals, their falling out of the political agenda. Accordingly, we can formulate a number of questions: 1) how real are the threats to Ukrainian society and the outside world from Ukrainian radicals? 2) perhaps Ukrainian politicians and the public underestimate all the threats posed by the representatives of Ukrainian radical structures? 3) to what extent is the situation with radical structures in Ukraine different from the situation with radicals in other European countries? These issues are the subject of the conference. Among the Ukrainian-language publications dedicated to Ukrainian radical nationalist groups are the works of a member of the “Svoboda” All-Ukrainian Union, head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Council in 2010-2012, 2015 – to date, and People’s Deputy of

Ukraine in 2012-2014 O. Sych<sup>1</sup>. In 2015, E. Andryushchenko defended his dissertation in which he analyzed the formation and development of Ukrainian right-wing radical organizations<sup>2</sup>. In 2020, O. Sych defended his doctoral dissertation on modern Ukrainian nationalism<sup>3</sup>. The joint publication of two Lviv researchers devoted to the development of Ukrainian radical parties after the Revolution of Dignity is noteworthy<sup>4</sup>. Significantly more publications were made in English in publications outside Ukraine. In our opinion, this is due to the increased attention of researchers and public opinion of democratic countries to the phenomenon of radicalism, including its Ukrainian equivalent. One of the first to address this problem was T. Kuzyo, an English political scientist of Ukrainian origin<sup>5</sup>. Subsequently, attention was focused on a wide range of activities of Ukrainian extreme rights<sup>6</sup>. A number of publications are devoted to the analysis of the activities of AUU "Svoboda"<sup>7</sup>.

At the same time, the presence of radical nationalist organizations in the political space of Ukraine, their activity especially in the context of threats to national security during the occupation and the actual war in eastern Ukraine, necessitate a permanent analysis of the state and trends of this movement.

In the context of Ukraine, by radical nationalist parties we mean, based on the assessment of Daniel Bochsler, the parties of the titular nation, which demand cultural homogeneity, deny the rights of minorities, advocate stronger political and economic centralization or promote irredentism<sup>8</sup>. Radical nationalist organizations operating in Ukraine today include the All-

<sup>1</sup> Sych O. Istorychnyj rozvytok ukraińskogo organizovanogo nacionalizmu // Osnovy nacionalizmu. Kurs I. Ivano-Frankivsk: Instytut politychnoi osvity VO "Svoboda". 2008. S. 41-55; Sych O.M. Organizacija ukraińskych nacionalistiv i stanovlennja struktur suchasnoho nacionalizmu // Prykarpats'kyj visnyk NTSh. Serija: Dumka. 2017. № 5/6. S. 181-194

<sup>2</sup> Andrijushhenko E. Ukraiński pravoradykalni organizacii u konteksti suspil'no-politychnyh procesiv (kinec' 1980-h – 2015 rr.). Dys... kand. ist. nauk: 07.00.00 / Zaporiz'kyj nacional'nyj universytet. Zaporizhzhja, 2015. 284 s

<sup>3</sup> Sych O. M. Suchasnyj ukraińskij nacionalizm: politologichni aspekty transformacijnoi paradygmy: avtoref. dys. ... dokt. polit. nauk: 23.00.01. Kyi'v, 2020. 40 s.

<sup>4</sup> Tanchyn I., Lucyshyn G. Ukraiński pravi radykalni partii' pislja Revolucii' Gidnosti // Politychni nauky. 2016. T. 2, № 2. S. 43-48

<sup>5</sup> Kuzio T. Radical nationalist parties and movement s in contemporary Ukraine before and after independence: The right and its politics, 1989-1994 // Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity. 1997. Vol. 25. Issue 2. P. 211-242

<sup>6</sup> Ishchenko V. Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation // European Politics and Society. 2016. Vol. 17. Issue 4. P. 453-472; Mierzejaska- Voznyak M. The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine // The Oxford Handbook of Radical Right / ed. by Jens Rydgren. Apr. 2018. URL: oxford/handbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/0780190274559.0001/oxford-9780190274559-e.30; Doroshenko L. Ukrainian nationalist parties and connective action: an analysis of electoral campaigning and social media sentiments // Information, Communication & Society. 2019. Vol. 22. Issue 10. P. 1376-1395; Umland A. The Far Right in Pro-and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society // Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. Spring 2020. Vol. 28. Issue 2. P. 247-268.

<sup>7</sup> Iovenko A. The ideology and development of the Social-National Party of Ukraine and its transformation into the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" in 1990-2004 // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2015. Vol. 48. Issue 2-3. P. 229-237; Likhachev V. Right-Wing extremism in Ukraine: the phenomenon of "Svoboda". Kyiv: EAJC. 2013. URL: library.jewseurasia.org/data/image/books/18/14/9/18149\_d.pdf; Shekhotsov A. The Creeping Resurgence of the Ukrainian Radical Right? The Case of the Freedom Party // Europa-Asia Studies. 2011. Vol. 63. Issue 2. P. 203-228; Shekhotsov A. From Para-Militarism to Radical Right-Wing Populism: The Rise of the Ukrainian Far-Right Party Svoboda // Right – Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse / edit. Ruth Wodak, MojibKhosravi, Nik and BrigitteVral. Bloomsbury London, New Delhi, New York, Sydney. 2013. P. 249-266; Bustikova L. Voting, identity and security threats in Ukraine: who supports the Radical "Freedom" Party // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2015. Vol. 48. Issue 2-3. P. 239-256; Romanyuk A. Peculiarities of structural construction and ideological positioning of the all-ukrainian union "Svoboda" // Studium Europy Srodkoweji Wschodniej. – Pórocznik, 2018, #10. – P.6-19.

<sup>8</sup> Bochsler D. The spread of the ethnic/nationalist divide over post-communist Europe // Post-communist social and political conflicts: citizenship and consolidation in new democracies of South East Europe Conference at the New Europe College. Bucharest. 1-3 June 2007. URL: citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.669.83608.rep=rep1&ctype=pdf.

Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the National Corps Party, "Right Sector" Party / Movement, and public association S 14 (Sich-14). They also include individual organizations, the list of which, as well as their activity, changes regularly, as they become the subject of public attention only for a short time.

The main unit of Ukrainian radicals is AUU "Svoboda". The party has a history dating back to 1991, when representatives of nationalist structures: the Guard of the Movement, the Student Brotherhood, the Spadshchyna OUM and the Ukrainian Veterans of Afghanistan founded the "Social National Party of Ukraine" (SNPU), which was officially registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine in 1995. In February 2004, at the IX Congress of the SNPU, the party changed its name to the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", and O. Tyahnybok was elected as the chairman of the party. In the activity of the party, on the basis of changing the level of support of the party by the citizens of Ukraine, we can distinguish three stages: the first – until February 2004; the second – since the party operated under the current name until 2014 and the third – from the early parliamentary elections in 2014 and to the present. In the process of analyzing the program documents and practical activities of the party, we will consider the indicators of party radicalism.

As a part of the first stage of development, the indicators of SNPU radicalism include:

1. The symbols of the party for which the monogram "Idea of the Nation" (I + N) was chosen. As the researcher A. Shekhovtsov noted, "This runic sign became sad information as a symbol of several SS divisions in the Nazi Reich, as well as some post-war neo-fascist organizations in Europe"<sup>9</sup>. The introduction of uniforms and the adoption of the very name "social-nationalism", which also, according to a number of experts, provided for an association with National Socialism of the Third Reich period;
  2. The presence of organizations of the paramilitary format "People's Security Detachments" and "Patriot of Ukraine", their use during party events and during a number of conflict situations;
  3. Attachment to the history of the OUN-URA, constant veneration of S. Bandera and many nationalist figures of the interwar period and the Second World War, while denying any assessments of nationalists and nationalist organizations of that period of non-positive content;
  4. Extensive use of radical rhetoric to assess historical and contemporary political events and phenomena, as exemplified by the speech of O. Tyahnybok on Mount Yavoryna in 2004;
- 5) Cooperation with the French National Front, which has traditionally been perceived in France and in democratic countries as a radical, anti-immigrant, right-wing political party in respect of which the country has actively applied the practice of "sanitary border".

<sup>9</sup> Shehovcov A. VO «Svoboda»: problema legitimacynosti borot'by za vladu – S. 179. URL: [uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf](http://uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf)

The second stage in the development of the AUU “Svoboda” begins with the IX Congress, which saw significant changes in the overall pattern of the party. A. Shekhovtsov wrote in this regard: “In early 2004, the “image makers” of the French National Front, with whom the SNPU had been cooperating since 2000 within the framework of Euronat, the European far-right alliance, consulted with the party leadership, as a result of which the social nationalists initiated a “rebranding of the party”<sup>10</sup>. The annoying previous name was changed, party symbols were changed, a relatively moderate program was approved, the “Patriot of Ukraine” paramilitary organization ceased to function, the party leadership began to look for allies outside nationalist party structures, and appealed to national democratic parties.

At the same time, AUU “Svoboda” continued to demonstrate its ability to take radical action. In particular, such demonstrations include nationalist marches. Initially, they were tested in some cities of Western Ukraine. Since 2005 onwards, the UPA March has been held annually on October 14 in Kyiv (in 2017 it was held under the slogan “March of Heroes’ Glory”) and since 2007 a joint torchlight march of nationalists in honor of S. Bandera took place in Kyiv annually on January 1. In addition, nationalists periodically held marches on current events in socio-political life<sup>11</sup>.

The party has developed cooperation with the structures of football fans and hooligans (it was relevant until 2014). The image of a single radical political force in this time space proved to be in demand. This was due to the following factors: 1) the inability of the “Nasha Ukraina” and AUU “Bat’kivshchyna” parties, as the main parties of the Orange Camp, to implement the demands made on the Maidan in 2004; 2) increasing of the level of support for potential voters of the Party of Regions with the threat of revenge and revision of the results of the Orange Revolution; 3) fatigue from the centrist parties and their leaders, who did not fulfill their declared obligations and were focused on fighting against each other for power. A. Shekhovtsov gives an interesting argument on the basis of calculating the frequency of appearances of representatives of AUU “Svoboda” in various kinds of television talk shows. He explains the Party of Regions’ interest in the broad presence of AUU “Svoboda” representatives in television broadcasts by the desire to weaken the positions of the “Orange Camp” parties in Western and Central Ukraine, which were basic to them. Accordingly, the media activity of the AUU “Svoboda” was to increase the number of votes for it<sup>12</sup>. Under these conditions, the party, which declared radical potential and phraseology (at that time actively used the slogan “Bandera will come – Bandera will bring order!”) was considered by many voters as the only real force capable of opposing the Party of Regions. The results of the elections to local authorities in a number of regions in 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012 were a manifestation of the change in the spirit

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<sup>10</sup> Shehovcov A. VO «Svoboda»: problema legitimacynosti borot’by za vladu. S. 186. URL: [uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf](http://uamoderna.com/images/archive/2013-20/shekhovtsov.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Do prykladu, 29 bereznja 2008 r. VO «Svoboda» bula organizatorom Marshu ukrai’ns’kogo gjjadacha v Kyjevi pid gaslom: «Vid kina ukrai’ns’kogo – do Ukrai’ns’kogo kina!»

<sup>12</sup> A. Shehovcov. Vkazana pracja. S.198-199.

of the population. The party took an active part in the protests on the Maidan in late 2013. Party members initiated the demolition of the monument to Lenin in Kyiv in December 2013, which gave impetus to "Leninfall" throughout the country. During the Euromaidan protests in early 2014, 19 party members were killed and 123 were injured<sup>13</sup>. With the start of hostilities in Donbas, party members formed the Sich Battalion, whose personnel consisted mainly of party members and their sympathizers (in August 2015, due to the adoption at the legislative level of a ban on servicemen in the anti-terrorist operation zone to be members of a political party, the battalion personnel were already non-partisan).

**Table 1.** Results of the AUU "Svoboda" in the parliamentary elections<sup>14</sup>

		2006	2007	2012	2014	2019
	Ukraine	0,36	0,76	10,44	4,71	2,15
1	Lviv region	2,23	3,06	8,02	6,19	5,46
2	Ivano-Frankivsk region	1,28	3,41	33,79	8,81	8,39
3	Ternopil region	1,97	3,44	31,22	8,18	6,69
4	Volyn region	0,55	1,45	17,98	6,38	3,85
5	Kyiv	0,37	1,25	17,33	7,1	2,57
6	Rivne region	0,22	1,12	16,63	6,51	3,99
7	Khmelnysk region	0,31	0,48	11,79	5,43	2,83
8	Kyiv region	0,19	0,67	10,84	5,64	2,22
9	Cherkasy region	0,23	0,73	9,48	5,85	1,77
10	Chernivci region	0,41	0,76	8,71	4,82	1,86
11	Vinnysya region	0,14	0,47	8,4	4,25	1,54
12	Zakarpatska region	0,17	0,54	8,35	3,51	1,27
13	Poltava region	0,15	0,3	7,94	4,58	1,58
14	Zhytomyr region	0,13	0,39	7,47	4,16	1,54
15	Sumy region	0,13	0,21	6,37	4,24	1,05
16	Kirovograd region	0,13	0,25	6,22	4,11	1,32
17	Chernigiv region	0,11	0,28	5,98	3,87	1,16
18	Dnipropetrovsk region	0,1	0,27	5,19	2,84	0,85
19	Kherson region	0,07	0,2	4,71	3,52	0,96
20	Mykolaiv region	0,11	0,2	4,3	2,79	0,8
21	Zaporizhzhya region	0,06	0,21	3,85	2,2	0,66
22	Kharkiv region	0,07	0,22	3,83	2,08	0,68
23	Odessa region	0,12	0,17	3,3	2,3	0,53
24	Sevastopol city	0,05	0,09	1,37	-	-
25	Lugansk region	0,03	0,06	1,29	1,47	0,45
26	Donetsk region	0,03	0,08	1,2	1,19	0,6
27	Autonomous Republic of Crimea	0,05	0,09	1,04	-	-

<sup>13</sup> Istorija VO «Svoboda». URL: [svoboda.org/ua/party/history](http://svoboda.org/ua/party/history)

<sup>14</sup> CVK: Vybory narodnyh deputativ Ukraïny. URL: [cvk.gov.ua/vibory\\_narodnich\\_deputativ\\_ukraini.html](http://cvk.gov.ua/vibory_narodnich_deputativ_ukraini.html)

As we can see, after the party's rebranding in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections, the result was extremely symbolic, even in three oblasts in western Ukraine. During the 2012 parliamentary elections, the "Svoboda" All-Ukrainian Union achieved the greatest result in its history and in the history of the Ukrainian elections (we have already considered the grounds for such a result above).

The third stage in the development of the party, in our opinion, should be identified after the early parliamentary elections in 2014, when the party, under formally favorable conditions from the party's point of view, in particular in the context of "Svoboda" members' participation in the Revolution of Dignity events, participation in creation of voluntary divisions which took an active part in deterrence of the Russian aggression in Donbas and in general in the conditions of aggression, direct threat to national security, didn't manage to carry out deputies to parliament. The dynamics of further decline in party support for voters remained in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Moreover, during the 2019 parliamentary elections, the "Svoboda" All-Ukrainian Union and the "National Corps" and the "Right Sector" parties merged into a single nationalist bloc, respectively, hoping for synergy and consolidation of the electorate that supports nationalist discourse. However, this did not increase the result; moreover, there was a further decrease in the level of support. It is also worth paying attention to the results of the 2020 local elections. The total number of elected deputies of region, district, city, settlement and village councils and district councils in cities from AUU "Svoboda" amounted to 890 persons out of 24,438 (3.6%). 369 mayors were elected in the local elections, representatives of the "Svoboda" AUU won only in 6 cities (Khmelnyskyi – O. Simchyshyn, Ivano-Frankivsk – R. Martsinkiv, Ternopil – S. Nadal, Kamyanets – Podilskyi – M. Poitko, Konotop – A. Semenikhin and A. Naida Kalush – A. Naida). Thus, we can state that at present the level of support and influence of the party on the agenda of political life of Ukraine is minimal.

**Table 2.** Regional distribution of ideological orientations of Ukrainian citizens (in %) <sup>15</sup>

	West	Center	South	East
Ecological ("green")	4,0	1,8	5,3	2,8
Communist	0,4	1,7	2,5	2,1
Liberal	2,5	5,7	4,1	2,3
National-democratic	27,8	12,7	13,2	13,9
National-radical	4,7	2,8	1,2	2,3
Communist	0,2	1,0	0,4	1,7
Political direction, which includes the idea of reunification of Ukraine with Russia	0,6	1,0	6,6	5,4
Social-democratic	2,5	9,7	5,3	10,1
Socialist	0,8	2,5	4,1	6,2
Christian Democratic	5,5	2,3	0,4	0,6

<sup>15</sup> Centr imeni O. Razumkova: Ideologichni orijentacii gromadjan Ukraïny: zagal'nonacional'ne opytuvannya, cherven' 2018 r. URL: razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/presreliz-tsentru-razumkova-ideologichni-orietatsii-hromadian-ukrainy.

Other	1,7	3,4	2,5	2,1
No one	9,1	8,3	9,5	12,2
I do not orient myself in political currents	21,4	28,8	19,8	20,8
Difficult to answer	18,6	18,3	25,1	17,6
Social-democratic	9,1	8,3	9,5	12,2
In total	100	100	100	100

The comparisons of the level of support in the elections and indicators of ideological identifications of citizens, based on a survey conducted by the Razumkov Center's sociological service a year before the 2019 parliamentary elections, indicate that the identification corresponds to the national-radical ideological direction. At the same time, this indicates a low level of identification and support for radical nationalism in Ukrainian society and a slight advantage in the number of sympathizers in this area among the inhabitants of Western Ukraine, which has traditionally been recorded by many researchers. In our opinion, the decline in the level of support for the program and candidates from the "Svoboda" All-Ukrainian Union in the parliamentary, presidential<sup>16</sup> and local elections is explained by the following factors: first, the lack of results in the government of party representatives. Previous activities outside parliament and in the opposition, based on criticism and radical assessments, have expressed many voters' expectations of the party's / its representatives' ability to take decisive steps to crack down on corruption schemes, bring order quickly (slogan "Bandera will come – Bandera will bring the order") and carrying out reforms. However, being in power showed the illusory nature of such expectations. In particular, there were many accusations against the acting Prosecutor General of Ukraine, member of the "Svoboda" AUU Makhnitskyi (when he was appointed, he left the party). He was accused of lacking any results in the investigation of crimes during the Revolution of Dignity and in the fight against corruption. Moreover, he himself was accused of acts of corruption and unethical acts<sup>17</sup>. Secondly, the negative character had a situation with the head of the Lviv Regional State Administration Iryna Sekh, which categorically refused to carry out a constitutional norm that did not allow a combination of a public office with the position of a people's deputy of Ukraine and despite the requirements of the public and protests, continued to stay simultaneously on two positions. At the same time, she was in Kyiv most of the time, without paying due attention to solving the problems of the region<sup>18</sup>.

In the presidential election of 2019, "Liberty" nominated Ruslana Koshulinskyi candidate. As a result, he gained 1.62%, or 307,244 votes. At the same time, the result exceeded the conditional 5% threshold only in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Lviv regions.

Thirdly, one of the main messages of the party, especially in the face of I. Farion, was the requirements of the domination of the Ukrainian language and coercive ukrainianization of

<sup>16</sup> In the presidential election of 2019, AUU@ nominated Ruslana Koshulinskyi candidate. As a result, he gained 1.62%, or 307,244 votes. At the same time, the result exceeded the conditional 5% threshold only in Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Lviv regions.

<sup>17</sup> The figure of the former executive duties of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine Oleg Myrhytskyi becomes more interesting. URL: [Protocol.ua/ua/postat\\_kolishnogo\\_vikonuyuczogo\\_obov\\_yazki\\_generalnogo\\_prokurora\\_ukraini\\_oleg\\_machnitskogo\\_stae\\_vse\\_dali\\_tsikavishoyu](http://Protocol.ua/ua/postat_kolishnogo_vikonuyuczogo_obov_yazki_generalnogo_prokurora_ukraini_oleg_machnitskogo_stae_vse_dali_tsikavishoyu)

<sup>18</sup> Iryna Sekh is convenient for two armchairs. URL: [WZ.LVIV.UA/BLOGS/126372-Ini-SKH-ZRUCZNO-NA-DVOCH-KRISLACH](http://WZ.LVIV.UA/BLOGS/126372-Ini-SKH-ZRUCZNO-NA-DVOCH-KRISLACH)



citizens, which Use Russian and names in Russian transcription<sup>19</sup>. These statements proved to dissonance with a significant involvement of citizens who used Russian, to the events on the Maidan during the dignity revolution, among volunteers and ATO participants. Fourthly, more attention to the activity of the AUU “Svoboda” activities allowed identifying an opaque system of financing a party from the businessman I. Krivetskyi, its close ties with Ukrainian oligarchs and its decisive impact on the policy and behavior of the party<sup>20</sup>. Collectively, the practice has unmasked the myths or hopes of some citizens that radical nationalists are fundamentally different from Ukrainian parties that were previously in power and failed to achieve the expected results in reforming the country.

The main manifestations of the party’s radicalism in the third stage should be considered sharp criticism of Russia as a threat to national security; public dissemination of positive assessments of S. Bandera and other figures of the OUN-URA and the organizations themselves, including soldiers of the SS “Halychyna” division; conducting torchlight marches in the form of similar marches of fascists and right-wing radicals in European countries to the birthday of S. Bandera (1.01) and 14.10 March of Glory of Heroes (until 2014 – March of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), dedicated to the Day of Defender of Ukraine on the (Protection of Holy mother) holiday<sup>21</sup>. Thus, we can distinguish three stages in the activity of AUU “Svoboda”. The first stage covered the period of party formation and the search for and development of the program and pattern of the party; during the second stage there was a sharp increase in party support in the 2012 parliamentary elections and local elections due to the disappointment of a large number of citizens. political forces and hopes for the ability of radicals to act quickly and effectively not only to oppose the pro-Russian Party of Regions, but also to fight corruption and to carry out the necessary reforms.

The third stage was characterized by significant frustration of the majority of citizens in the practical activities of the party, which was reflected in the fall in the level of support for the AUU “Svoboda”. An analysis of the party’s positioning and activities shows that it adheres to the principles of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. Its radicalism is mainly reduced to sharp rhetoric / assessments and demonstrative marches, similar to rallies and demonstrations of right-wing radicals in European countries. As a rule, such events are not popular, but create a bright television image, which is fondly used by critics of Ukraine. Moreover, the owners of the event are one of the few arguments to prove the validity of Ukraine’s accusations of fascism. The insignificant level of support for the Svoboda All-Ukrainian Union and the considerable publicity of some of the party’s statements and actions give us grounds to speak about the party’s conditional influence on strengthening national security.

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<sup>19</sup> Farion puts the kindergarten on his ears. URL: [youtube.com/watch&v=wMMdDsCj0fk](https://youtube.com/watch&v=wMMdDsCj0fk) (28.04.2021).

<sup>20</sup> Leshchenko S. Gray Cardinal of AUU «Svoboda» Igor Kryvetskyi: I could stand up for myself. But this does not mean that I am a criminal authority. URL: [Pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/03/21/7019774/](https://pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/03/21/7019774/). (28.04.2021).

<sup>21</sup> March of Glory of Heroes. URL: [uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Марш\\_Слави\\_Героїв](https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Марш_Слави_Героїв) (28.04.2021)

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